A cornerstone of the scientific ethos is that editorial board members should be selected based on their scholarly achievements, as demonstrated by publications in peer-reviewed journals and evidence that their work is of value to others in their disciplines. To discern if this reasoning is applied in practice, this study examined the scholarly records of the editorial boards of premier peer-reviewed journals sponsored by the leading professional associations in management and six related disciplines.
For more than 300 years, peer review has been the touchstone for judging the quality and thus the credibility of scientific papers submitted for publication in a discipline's academic journals (Merton & Zuckerman, 1971 . The peer-review process is recognized as essential for accepting or rejecting knowledge claims prior to entering a discipline's published record (Bedeian, 2004) . As such, it not only plays a crucial role in determining the fate of ideas but also influences the career advancement of individual scholars (Baruch & Hall, 2004) . Successful publishing is necessary for academic tenure and promotion (Glick, Miller, & Cardinal, 2007) and translates into economic considerations relating to wages, resources, grants, and research funding (Bird, 2006) . Furthermore, by bestowing scientific eminence on published authors, the peer-review process has collateral consequences within the academic stratification system, as evidenced by professional recognition derived from formal awards and prestigious faculty appointments for those who publish. With specific reference to the management discipline, de Rond and production of discourse, editorial board members are agents who exercise ''power as discipline'' to control the distribution of acceptable knowledge. Institutionalized as gatekeepers, editorial board members serve as arbiters who appraise and authenticate competing claims to scientific originality. To Foucault (1975 Foucault ( /1977 , to be verifiable, every system for validating knowledge claims depends on social arrangements of power (such as editorial review boards) for the production and maintenance of that same knowledge (pp. [26] [27] [28] . Whereas Foucault insisted that power is neither good nor bad, he recognized that it can be misused if not exercised within a system of shared prescriptive norms. Following Foucault, editorial board members are central to reinforcing and renewing the development of scientific thought and, as such, occupy focal positions imbued with special significance for inculcating such norms.
In light of the critical role editorial boards play in authenticating knowledge claims, setting a discipline's expected standards of scientific rigor, and determining the advancement of individual scholars within the academic stratification system, it is puzzling that the scientific achievements of editorial board members remain a relatively neglected area of study. Whereas other disciplines have examined the ''scholarly ability'' of those selected to fulfill this role, to our knowledge no such effort has been made to investigate this issue as it applies to the management discipline. In this respect, to maintain public confidence and guard the autonomy and authority we enjoy as academics, it is necessary to demonstrate that the peer-review process within our discipline is conducted according to high standards of scholarship. Indeed, as an academic community, the management discipline derives its scientific authority from the public's expectation that the evaluation and certification of new knowledge occurs following the complex of norms and values embodied in the ethos of science. Moreover, knowing more about the ultimate costs and consequences of the peer-review process and understanding it better may suggest how it can be improved, enhancing our discipline's productivity and growth. Thus, our primary aim was to examine the scholarly records of the editorial board members of two premier management journals published by the discipline's principal professional association, using the achievements of board members from leading journals sponsored by the primary professional associations of six other disciplines as a comparative backdrop.
The Role of Editorial Boards
Authors are often told that ''editors are in the business of trying to publish articles, not reject them'' (Feldman, 2005, p. 649) . This assertion, however, is likely of little solace to the more than 75% of the management professoriate who failed to publish a single article in a ''premier'' management journal during the 14-year period 1984 to 1997 (Wiseman & Skilton, 1999) . The rejected authors are even less likely to find consolation when they learn that, according to one estimate, 25% of editors' and referees' comments ''might be wrong, overstated, or off point'' (Feldman, 2005, p. 654) .
Recognizing the high stakes for individual scholars and the knowledge-construction enterprise as a whole, the concept that individuals who serve as journal editorial board members should be scholars with recognized expertise within their disciplines is a cornerstone of the scientific ethos (Merton & Zuckerman, 1971 . As intimated by Kuhn (1970) and others supra, the view that editorial board members should be appointed based on their scientific achievements is reflected in the prescriptive norm that ''the merits of a manuscript be assessed by a scientific 'peer' working in the same field of research as its author'' (Bedeian, 2004, p. 202) . The importance of this norm derives from the belief that ''the goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge'' (Merton, 1942 (Merton, /1973 .
With this goal in mind, as Lindsey (1991) noted, the evaluation of a manuscript's potential for advancing a discipline's knowledge base extends beyond a simple assessment of its adequacy to the more difficult task of ''selecting [from] among the best papers those which are judged to be of the highest quality' ' (p. 314) . He went on to advise that ''the judgment of quality required here demands the competency and talent of a reviewer who has a record of outstanding accomplishment in research and scholarly inquiry'' and warned that ''without these credentials, the judgment of the reviewer would be open to more frequent and intensive questioning'' (Lindsey, 1976, p. 800) . Cole and Cole (1973) added that, unless editorial board members are appointed based on their scientific achievements, the academic community may find it difficult to view their authority as legitimate (p. 80).
Based on this reasoning, editorial board membership requires a proven record of scientific achievement, as demonstrated by publications in peer-reviewed journals and evidence that one's work is of value to others in one's discipline (Pardeck & Meinert, 1999) . If this reasoning is applied in practice, we would expect to find supporting evidence in the scholarly records of editorial board members representing the management discipline. Stated more formally, this reasoning is captured in the following research questions:
What are the scholarly achievements of the editorial board members affiliated with two premier management journals published by the discipline's principal professional association? How do these scholarly achievements compare with those of editorial board members affiliated with leading journals sponsored by the primary professional associations in six other disciplines?
It is important that readers clearly understand that, as discussed below, we are not saying that editorial appointments should be made solely based on number of publications and associated citations. We recognize that it takes more than a ''high-power'' name to prepare a thoughtful review and, however eminent, all humans are susceptible to the same biases and errors in judgment. Consistent with recognized norms of science, however, we do contend that those serving in editorial board roles should have demonstrated through their own peer-reviewed publications the competency required to understand the complexities of the work to be judged so as to make informed recommendations regarding which manuscripts are accepted or rejected.
Method Sample of Journals
The target population for the current study consisted of editorial board members from leading peer-reviewed journals in the disciplines of accounting, economics, finance, management, marketing, psychology, and sociology. The specific journals chosen as the basis for analysis are all official publications of professional associations representing the aforementioned topical areas. The areas themselves were selected because of our desire to include a broad representation of business-school disciplines as well as three of their most prominent social-science cousins (viz., economics, psychology, and sociology). The journals and the associations they represent are Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) and Academy of Management Review (AMR), published by the Academy of Management; Accounting Review (AR), published by the American Accounting Association; American Economic Review (AER), published by the American Economics Association; Journal of Finance (JF), published by the American Finance Association; Journal of Marketing Research (JMR), published by the American Marketing Association; Psychological Bulletin (PB), published by the American Psychological Association; and American Sociological Review (ASR), published by the American Sociological Association.
In that we considered numerous other journals before selecting this set as the basis for our analysis, we acknowledge that our final choices were necessarily a matter of opinion. At the same time, we believe that the journals we selected, if not the flagship journals of their sponsoring associations, are all generally recognized as established journals with wide intellectual influence in their respective disciplines. We purposefully selected journals sponsored by professional associations rather than those affiliated with individual universities or departments to avoid any in-house bias that might be reflected in editorial board membership or citation patterns. We likewise limited our selections to journals published by professional associations as opposed to for-profit journals owned by publishing companies to avoid any questions concerning editorial independence. Moreover, sponsorship by a learned society provides a scientific stamp of approval absent from journals owned by a publishing company. In addition, we selected only journals in which, in principle, the full membership of a discipline might publish, as opposed to narrower specialty journals with more limited constituencies. By selecting journals with a broad reader base who share a common background of substantive knowledge and methodological expertise, we avoided confounds associated with publication preferences across subfields. Future research may wish to expand the scope of our analyses by including additional disciplines as well as a larger number of editorial boards representing a wider cross section of general and specialty journals, institutional sponsorships, and countries.
Sample of Editorial Board Members
The data for the current study were collected during October and November 2005. The sample consisted of 274 editorial board members whose names were collected from the mastheads of the most recent issues of the journals selected as the basis for our analysis. Because AMJ (N = 111), AMR (N = 78), AR (N = 96), and JMR (N = 94) had such large editorial boards, a systematic-sampling procedure was employed, wherein we used a random seed to select every third name from among those listed. Assuming the alphabetized order of the board members' last names is unrelated to scholarly achievement, systematic random sampling results in a more uniform distribution of respondent attributes than does simple random sampling and, thus, greater sampling reproducibility (Hart, 1999) . The size of the subsamples was based on (a) the average size of the four remaining editorial boards, from which we obtained a complete enumeration; (b) a concern that parameter estimates be made with acceptable precision; and (c) a concern that comparisons across journals be made with equal statistical power. In each instance, a one-third sampling fraction was sufficient to ensure an accurate estimate of population means for number of authored or coauthored articles within ± 2 units with 90% confidence.
Measures. Two metrics were used to measure scholarly achievement at the individual level: editorial board member productivity and quality of production. A third metric was used to quantify the cumulative impact and relevance of the research output of each editorial board as a group. Information used to compute each metric came from the Web of Science, an online database published by Thomson Scientific (Philadelphia), which has published indices to academic journals since 1963. The Web of Science is composed of the Science Citation Index, Social Science Citation Index, and Arts & Humanities Citation Index. Over the period covered by the data-collection dates, the Web of Science indexed more than 8,700 journals. Although this coverage cannot be said to be complete, the Web of Science does provide access to a wide variety of multidisciplinary, multipublisher, and geographically diverse sources, including an overwhelming majority of the world's prominent and influential refereed journals.
Other databases offer citation indexing. The Web of Science, however, is recognized as having the greatest coverage historically, as well as functionality and sophistication that exceed other databases (Norris & Oppenheim, 2007) . Scopus, for example, only offers indexing coverage for the social sciences from 1996. The citation counts from Google Scholar, the beta version of which was launched in 2004, are generally considered highly suspect and consistently unreliable (Jacsó, 2006) . CSA Illumina, formerly Cambridge Scientific Abstracts; is notably limited in its coverage of the social sciences. The worldwide acceptance of the Web of Science is reflected in the fact that it is the source for statistics used by the European Commission, the 30-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the National Science Foundation, and as a basis for the Research Assessment Exercise on publication patterns of U.K. academics (Gauffriau & Larsen, 2005) . In a word, the Web of Science is the ''gold standard'' for databases offering indexing in the social sciences (Martin, 2007) .
The Web of Science platform indexes all items that appear in the list of references accompanying every article published in each of the journals included in its coverage. In doing so, it provides author and publication information as well as data on the number of times an author or item has been cited and by whom. Of the eight journals that are the basis for our analysis, all but one has been indexed by Web of Science since first being published. The one exception is AMR, which was first indexed beginning with Volume 8(2), 1983. To fill this gap, the Academy of Management's online archive was accessed, and publication counts for editorial board members who may have published in AMR were verified manually.
A notable advantage of the Web of Science is that it provides publication and citation information in a timely manner and independent of the potential pitfalls associated with personal-report data obtained from interviews and surveys (Baker, 1990) . Web of Science indexing cannot, however, eliminate inconsistencies in source documents (e.g., orthographic variants, misspellings, and incorrect citations); and it makes no corrections for authors who may change their names. Likewise, homographs or namesakes-authors with identical names and initials-can be a troublesome occurrence. Some intellectual effort is thus required when verifying citations (Wooding, Wilcox-Jay, Lewison, & Grant, 2006) .
To address such drawbacks, we used author titles and addresses, accessed personal Web sites, searched online university library catalogs, and referenced indexes and databases such as Dissertation Abstracts whenever there was doubt about citation attributions. Our familiarity with the types of journals in which a given board member is likely to have published and knowledge of the institutional affiliations of board members helped minimize this problem. Finally, it should be noted that, although at one time the Web of Science indexed citations only by an article's primary author, its current database provides citation credit to secondary as well as primary authors back to 1970 (a period that extends beyond the terminal degree dates of all but six [2%] of the editorial board members in our sample).
Production. To assess the productivity of individual board members, we hand tabulated the total number of articles authored by all 274 board members in our sample. Although the Web of Science also indexes book reviews, manuscripts, editorial comments, corrections, and letters, we counted journal articles only so as to limit our analysis to material that had been peer reviewed. Following accepted practice for apportioning credit for collaborative work (see Persson, Glänzel, & Danell, 2004) , we then constructed the variable adjusted total articles. This procedure involved dividing each article by the number of authors and summing those fractions to obtain a productivity measure for each board member. Symbolically,
where n i equals the number of authors for article i and 1 through j represent the first to last articles produced by a board member (Lindsey, 1980, p. 153) . We chose this weighting scheme to avoid inflating productivity scores due to the ''multiplier effect'' resulting from collaborative efforts and to reflect more accurately the actual contributions of individual board members to a discipline's scientific discourse (Lindsey, 1982, p. 390) . It is generally agreed among bibliometricians that it is best to assign credit proportionally for multiauthored papers (Harsanyi, 1993) , as total counting (as opposed to fractional counting) essentially equates coauthorship with sole authorship (Bergh, Perry, & Hanke, 2005) .
Finally, for several reasons, we did not attempt to take sequence of authorship into account in assessing article production. First, prior research has shown that it is nearly impossible to decompose the relative contributions of multiple authors to a collaborative work, as the sum of the percentage contribution individual authors would attribute to themselves will almost invariably add to over 100% (Bazerman, 1999, p. 202) . This explains why credit for joint authorships can be a contentiousness issue (Floyd, Schroeder, & Finn, 1994) . Second, there is no universal basis for determining order of authorship. Whereas it may be presumed that the contribution of a manuscript's authors is proportional to the order in which they are listed, this is not always the case. As Bird (2006) noted, ''the order of authorship can contain a meaning above and beyond authorship alone'' (p. 412). Tarnow (1999; Appendix B) provided a list of various reasons for assigning and ordering authorship, including such justifications as ''relationship building'' and ''political reasons.'' Third, although various rules for weighing order of authorship have been proposed (for a review of alternative approaches, see Egghe, Rousseau, & Van Hooydonk, 2000) , as Colman, Dhillion, and Coulthard (1995) noted, the selection of relative weights is ''inevitably arbitrary and conjectural'' (p. 63). Finally, on a more practical level, although there have been various mathematical methods suggested for quantifying authorship order, they have been generally shown to yield results that differ very little (if at all) from the fractional counting approach developed by Lindsey (1980) and used in our analysis. See, for example, Shortz et al. (1994) and Cox and Blount (1989) for comparisons of the Lindsey (1980) approach with a method for proportionally weighing authorship order developed by Howard, Cole, and Maxwell (1987) . In this latter method, an author in ordinal position i + 1 always receives 50% of the authorship credit assigned to the author immediately preceding him or her (i.e., 50% of the credit assigned to author i). We reanalyzed our AMR and AMJ data to compare the results of the method we used with that employed by Howard et al. (1987) . We found Spearman correlations between the two methods for both journals that approached unity. This suggests, then, that the methods would yield identical results and are equally accurate for their intended purpose.
Quality of production. Whereas productivity is one measure of scholarly performance, quality of production would typically be considered a separate and more important issue in assessing a board member's scientific achievements (Price, 1963, p. 40) . To better pinpoint the quality of editorial board member article output, we computed Lindsey's (1978a) corrected quality index (CQI) for each board member in our sample. The CQI is a composite measure that combines the separate dimensions of production and citation into a single score indicating the average number of times a scholar has been cited. As Leung (2007) noted in a recent AMJ editorial essay, citation impact is the ''sine qua non of scholarly assessment'' (p. 510).
The CQI is derived by multiplying a scholar's citations-to-production ratio (C/P) by the geometric mean of the scholar's citations (from all items indexed in the Web of Science) and production. The geometric mean ( ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi C * P p ) provides a measure of central location for the C/P ratio and, in doing so, serves as a correction term by considering the relative contribution of C and P to the functional relation expressed in the CQI calculation (Lindsey, 1978a, pp. 350-351) . We again controlled for the ''multiplier effect'' associated with joint authorship by summing the fractions created by dividing each citation to an article by its number of authors to yield an adjusted total-citation count. Combining the resulting data with that obtained from the productivity index described above, we applied the following formula to create a quality of production variable:
The construct validity of citations as a yardstick of quality rests on the proposition that the number of citations a scholar receives is an indicator of the relative ''quality'' of the scholar's work (Lindsey, 1989) . The logic underlying this reasoning is straightforward: If a scholar's work is of high quality, it will be used by others and will be among the works most cited, whereas works of relatively lesser quality will attract few, if any, citations (Margolis, 1967) . Other approaches to gauging quality have been suggested. All, however, rely on proxies for quantifying what is essentially an intangible concept. In our judgment, of the various approaches that have been proposed, the CQI provides the most persuasive measure of scholarly quality.
Cumulative editorial board impact. To quantify the cumulative impact of each editorial board's scholarly achievements in toto, we selected Hirsch's (2005, p . 16569) h-index. A scholar's h score is the largest number of the scholar's n articles that have received at least h citations. A scholar with an h = 25 has published 25 articles that have each received at least 25 citations. The h-index has the advantage of giving a cumulative estimate of a scholar's publication activity and citation impact.
Furthermore, the h-index offers the advantage of being relatively unaffected by either an excess of uncited articles or a small number of supercited articles (Braun, Glänzel, & Schubert, 2006) . In other words, as Cronin and Meho (2006) explained, ''an author with very few high-impact articles or, alternatively, many low-impact articles will have a weak h-index. Crudely put, the h-index helps us distinguish between a 'one-hit wonder' and an enduring performer'' (p. 1275). Thus, it is possible for two scholars to have identical h scores even though their total numbers of articles or their total citation counts are different. As an example, the overall impact of a scholar who has published 35 articles of which only 10 have received 10 or more cites would be considered equivalent to that of a scholar who has published 15 articles of which 10 have received 10 or more cites. In this sense, one attraction of the h-index is that it identifies researchers who have made ''sustained and significant contributions'' but may not have enjoyed the reputation they deserve (Van Raan, 2006, p. 492) .
Following a suggestion offered by Hirsch (2005) and recently implemented by the SPIRES high-energy physics database (http://www.slac.stanford.edu/spires/hep), we computed an h-index for each of the eight editorial boards we studied. When calculated on a group basis, h is more than simply the sum of individual group members' h scores. As Hirsch (2005) explained, the overall h index of a group will generally be larger than that of each of the members of the group but smaller than the sum of the individual h indices, because some of the papers that contribute to each individual's h will no longer contribute to the group's h. (p. 16572) This occurs in part because shared authorship among group members reduces a group's total number of articles (Np).
In computing h scores for the eight editorial boards, we again used the Web of Science database because it is unique in allowing the entry of multiple names in performing citation searches. The sets of names constituting each board were restricted, however, as only names that uniquely identified board members could be entered. This requirement limited the eight sets from 69.2% to 59.4% of their respective totals. In that the commonality of an author's name should not be correlated with either a board member's productivity or citation frequency, h indices computed in this manner should still yield unbiased estimators of his or her corresponding population parameters (Hirsch, 2005) . The influence of this restriction is further minimized by the fact that, as noted, the contribution of individual members to a group's h score is not necessarily proportional to the group's overall score. Table 1 presents median productivity frequencies and ranges for the editorial board members of the management, accounting, economics, finance, marketing, psychology, and sociology journals used in our analysis. These figures reflect the volume of the board members' contributions to the knowledge base within their respective disciplines. We report median frequencies to describe the distributions of board members' productivity because the ranges of adjusted total articles are quite large, with a 56.25 difference between the highest (ASR = 57.08) and lowest values (AMJ = 0.83).
Results
With the exception of JMR, the distributions of median productivity scores are positively skewed, with only AMJ having a distribution exceeding accepted levels for skewness (viz., not more than 2.0 or less than −2.0; Kenney, 1939, p. 72) . Given that univariate normal distributions produce skewness statistics that equal 0, the relative asymmetry in AMJ scores suggests that its editorial board is staffed with a small number of members who have a large number of publications and a disproportionate number of members with relatively fewer publications.
This interpretation is confirmed by looking at the median number of total articles published by AMJ editorial board members. At 6.33, the AMJ frequency is ranked seventh among the eight editorial boards. The median article count for AMJ board members is also significantly lower than the productivity frequencies of all except the AR editorial boards when assessed by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test (K = 12:85, p < :01). Overall, the data in Table 1 indicate that the AMJ editorial board is composed of individuals whose volume of scholarly contributions exceeds those in accounting; however, its members are not distinguished by their productivity in comparison to their AMR colleagues or their counterparts in economics, finance, marketing, psychology, and sociology. Table 2 displays the median-adjusted citation and median-corrected quality index (CQI) frequencies and ranges for the editorial board members of all eight journals. Because the AR and AMJ boards recorded the lowest median productivity counts, it is not surprising that they also had the lowest median-adjusted total citation count. Simply put, if individual board members are not publishing, there is little that others can cite from their prior work. In counterpoint, as PB had the highest median-adjusted article count, it also had the highest median-adjusted citation count.
In comparing the CQI figures in Table 2 with the figures in Table 1 , a somewhat different picture emerges. By providing a combined measure of the quality and quantity of articles produced, the CQI provides a more accurate index of scholarly achievement. Based on this measure, the AMR editorial board received the highest relative score. This shift indicates that articles authored by AMR editorial board members received on average a higher number of citations than articles authored by board members staffing any of the seven other journals we studied, suggesting that AMR board members enjoy a comparatively higher level of scientific distinction. By contrast, AMJ's relatively modest ranking in this regard suggests two conclusions: (a) the consistently high CQI scores of AMR editorial board members cannot be generalized to the scores of other editorial boards in the management discipline and (b) with CQI scores running from 1.16 to 13,765.34, the Note: Adjusted-total citations = the sum of the fractions created by dividing each citation to an article authored by an editorial board member by its number of authors. CQI (Corrected Quality Index) = a composite measure combining the separate dimensions of production and citation into a single score indicating the average number of times a scholar has been cited. a. A one-third sample.
AMJ editorial board is composed of members with a wide range of scientific achievements.
To further explore this finding, Table 3 presents adjusted-total citation counts in percentage format for the eight journals we studied. Almost one third of the AMJ editorial board members sampled had citation counts ≤50, and nearly 6 in 10 had counts ≤100. The wide variation in AMJ board member citations is indicative of a Bradford-type distribution, wherein a few board members account for a large percentage of the board's total publications (see Table 1 ) and an even larger percentage of its citations (Garfield, 1980) . Indeed, 49% of the total citations to articles by AMJ board members were contributed by only four individuals (11% of our sample), with two of the four contributing 34% of all citations. This lopsided balance is in part a result of the fact that some 50% of the AMJ board members had published fewer than a dozen (raw count) articles in journals indexed by the Web of Science. Whereas the total-citation count for AMJ board members is roughly comparable to that for ASR and more than twice that for AR, it stands in contrast once again with AMR as well as with AER, JF, JMR, and PB.
Finally, we computed Hirsch's h-index for each of the eight editorial boards to quantify the cumulative impact of their scholarly achievements (Table 4) . With the exception of the PB editorial board, with h = 63, the AMR board recorded the highest h score (i.e., 57). The h indices for the AMJ, AER, and ASR editorial boards were clustered in a second group ranging from 51 to 53, followed by the JF (h = 42) and JMR (h = 44) boards, and then the AR board (h = 23), in a distant eighth place. Referring back to Table 3 , the high PB h-score is explained by the 13% of its editorial board members that have citation counts greater than 800. On this basis it may be concluded that (a) the scholarly achievements of the PB and AMR editorial boards have had a higher level of cumulative impact than those of the other boards we studied; (b) the AMJ, AER, and ASR boards are roughly comparable with respect to the cumulative impact of their scholarly achievements; and (c) the same may be said for the JF and JMR boards.
Discussion
Our intent in undertaking the current study was to cast an empirical light on the scientific achievements of editorial board members, particularly those of two premier management journals, and then to compare their scholarly records with those of their counterparts from six other disciplines. In accord with institutional imperatives that represent the ethos of science, we argue that board members should be selected based on their scholarly abilities, as demonstrated by publications in peer-reviewed journals and evidence that their work is of value to others. We have also maintained that if board members are appointed on any other basis, it will be difficult for their authority to be seen as legitimate by the academic community. As Lindsey (1978b) asked, ''How is respect to be acquired, if not earned?' ' (p. 73) . In this regard the data presented here pertaining to two of the management discipline's premier journals create a mixed picture.
On the one hand, our data indicate that, compared to their counterparts in psychology and sociology, neither the AMR nor the AMJ editorial boards is distinguished by the volume of its contributions to our discipline's scientific literature. In looking at the more important issue of quality of articles produced, however, the AMR editorial board received the highest relative rating among all eight editorial boards we studied. This contrasted with the AMJ editorial board, whose rating exceeded only that received by the AR. In comparing the AMJ and AMR boards, the relatively modest score for AMJ board members on the corrected quality index suggests that as a group they have contributed less to our discipline's knowledge base and, in turn, have not obtained the same level of scientific distinction. When combined with the h-indices reported in Table 4 , our data suggest that different criteria may have been used for selecting AMR and AMJ editorial board members. It is beyond our data to discern whether particularistic, nonscientific factors (e.g., friendships or political considerations) were at play in selecting board members for either journal. Our data do, however, cast doubt on the orthodox view that our discipline's toptiered journals necessarily have ''the best scholars on their editorial boards'' (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005, p. 486) , as well as the notion that editorial board appointments are ''grounded in a meritocracy system'' (Feldman, in press ).
To take but one example at the heart of our thesis, if a board member has authored only two articles that have garnered fewer than five (adjusted) citations or has authored only three articles that have attracted fewer than two (adjusted) citations (as in our AMJ sample), there is reason to question the individual's role in validating new discoveries in our discipline and the individual's corresponding impact on the advancement of others within our profession. In contrast, if a board member has authored, say, some 20 articles that have attracted close to 450 citations (as in our AMR sample), there is reason to believe that the individual has produced work of high quality and possesses the talent necessary to examine the scientific merits of competing knowledge claims.
We recognize that it takes more than a ''high-power'' name to prepare a thoughtful review and do not advocate making editorial appointments without due consideration being given to the quality of a referee's reports. Whereas scientific expertise is essential, no doubt there are ''high-power'' individuals whose performance as a referee has been disappointing. Acknowledging the obvious-that referees must be objective, free from Note: h-index = a value equal to the highest number of articles an editorial board (as a group) has published that have received at least that number of citations.
conflicts of interest, and able to prepare a timely critique that is helpful to an editor and a manuscript's authors- Rockwell (2006) advises that the ideal referee, is a researcher who is working in the same discipline as the subject of [a] paper . . . will understand the hypotheses underlying the work and will be familiar with the model systems and methods used . . . be able to judge the quality of the data and the analyses and assess the validity of the conclusions [and] will be able to assess the significance of the work to the field. (p. 4)
In this respect, it seems reasonable for editorial board members to be chosen based on their scholarly credentials as well as selected ''work samples.'' The bottom line in any instance, however, is that authors are entitled to, and should expect nothing less than, a rigorous review process wherein a talented editor joins with referees who have demonstrated, through their own peer-reviewed publications, the competency required to understand the complexities of the work to be judged (Lindsey, 1999) . The knock-on effects of commissioning individuals to vet a manuscript when they are not true peers to its author, in the sense of being equally versed in the field of research in which they are being asked to review, has been a topic of discussion within the management discipline for several years (Bedeian, 1996) .
We recognize the belief that those with the warrant to validate knowledge claims before they enter a discipline's published record should have met the same exacting institutional requirements demanded by the roles they occupy is at its core analogous to a staffing decision. The notion being advanced, however, is little more than a personification of Weber's (1922 Weber's ( /1947 view that employees should be selected based on expertise (p. 335). For this reason, we believe that journals should have clearly set-out criteria for selecting suitably qualified peer reviewers. That there may not be agreement about what these criteria should entail is not surprising. Viewed from a measurement perspective, scientific expertise is an unobserved latent construct that is hypothesized to be a good predictor of performance (i.e., an informed review). As noted above, this hypothesis is rooted in norms and values that have developed over the past 300 years and that are widely considered by the academic community and the general public as essential for the credibility of scientific results.
This, however, does not answer the question of how best to identify observed indicators of scientific achievement for the purpose of selecting editorial board members. In our model, which draws on institutional imperatives that make up the ethos of science, the main observed indicator is a proven record of scientific achievement, as demonstrated by publications in peer-reviewed journals (quantity) and evidence that one's work is of value to others in one's discipline (quality). Thus, our model infers that individuals possess the scientific expertise necessary to serve as editorial board members based on the regularity of their publications in recognized outlets and the number of times the publications have been cited by others. In the view of some, additional indicators may include geography (i.e., individuals may be invited to serve as editorial board members because they live in a foreign country despite a less-than-stellar scholarly record), speed and length of reviews provided in the past (as noted anecdotally by an anonymous referee), quality of past reviews (regardless of an individual's publication record), or expertise in a narrow yet important methodological domain (e.g., multilevel modeling).
Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the norms and values reflected in the institutional imperatives associated with the ethos of science are superior to other possible conceptualizations for judging a potential editorial board member's qualifications for critiquing a manuscript (Polak, 1995) . Thus, one could argue that other indicators (such as those enumerated above) may be equally as predictive of an individual's performance as an editorial board member. Such an argument, however, ignores the reality that-as apposite to other academic communities likewise striving for legitimacy-our discipline's scientific authority derives from the public's expectation that the evaluation and certification of new knowledge occurs following the complex of norms and values embodied in the ethos of science. Furthermore, in our view, an advantage of our model is that it defines scientific expertise based on the judgment of multiple peers (i.e., those who reviewed and recommended manuscripts for publication and those who subsequently cited them), whereas in alternative models, expertise is based on the judgment of a single person (i.e., an editor who reads reviews provided by an ad hoc referee, for instance, and is pleased with their quality). For this reason, we concur with a statement issued by the American Psychological Association (2005): ''To be selected as a reviewer, you must have published articles in peer-reviewed journals. The experience of publishing provides a reviewer with the basis for preparing a thorough, objective review'' (p. 820). This statement expresses the belief that those selected to judge the credibility of scientific claims should have likewise passed through ''the gauntlet of peer review'' (Brown, 2004, p. 250) before being placed in a gatekeeper role.
Foucault's work highlights the consequences of empanelling editorial board members without the knowledge and publication experience necessary to make valid recommendations on which manuscripts are accepted or rejected. In particular, it underscores how such a practice influences the construction of knowledge and, in turn, restrains the advancement of discourse within a discipline. For Foucault (1981) , social arrangements (such as editorial boards) are a means for controlling sanctioned knowledge and seizing power over the production of discourse. In short, this is why peer review is seen by students of the knowledge-creation process as one of the most crucial institutions in science (Lindsey, 1979) . In a direct way, then, the influence of editorial board members goes beyond assisting editors in making publication decisions. In particular, as observed earlier, the judgment of board members regarding the value and validity of a work as well as the suggestions they provide to authors for revisions establish a discipline's scientific standards. This is especially the case with respect to the editorial board members of a discipline's premier journals. The impact of their recommendations and opinions on what is acceptable and unacceptable is felt worldwide, determining not only a discipline's current character but also its future progress.
Of special concern in this regard is the notion that peer reviews should serve a ''developmental function'' that is largely pedagogical in nature so as to instruct authors in their craft. When authors have to respond to comments from referees who are not truly peers, the logic of ''developmental reviews'' is turned on its head. In such situations, the notion that ''the highest-quality feedback [is received] from the best . . . journals'' (Haveman, 2007, p. 2) is cast in doubt, as it is authors who are placed in the role of educating referees and not vice versa. We suspect that the increasing use of metacommentary within manuscripts, wherein authors supply explanations of rudimentary material, is intended to ''develop'' referees as much as readers. Whatever the case, authors must respond to comments from peer and nonpeer referees alike, and in so doing, the ultimate content and style of their work is influenced, as are the standards of our discipline.
Although it may be claimed that authors are free to parry referee comments, at least one seasoned author is less sanguine in this regard, stating: ''The scales are tipped so decisively in favor of reviewers that authors who rebut reviewers' suggestions are playing with their academic lives'' (Ashforth, 2005, p. 402) . Stated more directly, by not complying with referee comments, wannabe authors risk securing publication and jeopardizing their careers. The extent of the pressure felt in this regard is suggested by a study of 173 lead authors of articles published in AMJ and AMR from 1999 to 2001 (Bedeian, 2003) . Nearly 25% of the authors reported that to placate a referee or editor they had actually made changes in their manuscripts that they as authors felt were incorrect.
From the perspective of two former journal editors (N:B:: AGB and DDV are past editors of the Journal of Management), we have seen aspiring authors (fledgling and veteran) confronted with increasing referee demands. In our collective experiences and in conversations with colleagues, we are aware that more and more authors have encountered situations where referees have worked on papers to the point where they deserve to be listed as coauthors. This may be fine if one operates on the assumption that the referees in question are disciplinary ''peers'' who possess a competency validated by a record of scholarly publications. If this is not the case, however, we are concerned that the peer-review process will deteriorate into what Demski (2001) referred to as a state of unfounded ''referee intrusion and voyeurism.' ' We hasten to acknowledge that editors do not simply count the number of favorable reviews a manuscript receives in making final publication decisions and that they may differentially weigh referee reports. At the same time, we believe it is unreasonable to claim that referee judgments do not influence a manuscript's ultimate fate. In particular, recognizing that decision-making processes vary by journal and that academics tend to be specialists with relatively narrow spheres of expertise, the Action Editor of this article has speculated that ''editors of journals with greater numbers of submissions and greater breadth of topics . . . need to rely on a 'vote-counting' process more often than journals with fewer submissions and higher levels of specialization'' (H. Aquinis, personal letter, August 20, 2007). We would also expect this to be the case, noting that, like other academics, editors tend to be specialists who are relatively less familiar with areas of expertise outside their own spheres of interest and, thus, less comfortable passing judgment on research in other domains (Glick et al., 2007) .
In making these comments, we risk being criticized by those who seek inclusivity in the knowledge-construction enterprise (e.g., March, 2004) . Together with others who have commented on this consideration (Humphreys, 2002) , we have no quarrel with this objective as long as it is given secondary status to a referee's scientific achievements. We encourage casting the widest net possible so as to engage newer scholars with newer paradigms; however, we believe they should be active researchers who have published their work in recognized outlets. If criteria other than scientific achievement are used for selecting editorial board members, they should be clearly articulated and objective to ensure that editorial board appointments are not seen as inherently political, based on subjective influences involving personal affinities and other nonmerit considerations such as institutional connections, doctoral origin, and external pressures to be socially inclusive (Pardeck, 1992b) .
We would also note that academic honors such as editorial board appointments lose their distinction when awarded on grounds other than scientific merit. Although dated, the one previous study in this area of which we are aware found that 64% of those sampled (i.e., ''individuals who, because of their journal affiliations or professional association responsibilities, [had] an unusual capacity to shape the field of organizational behavior'') felt that ''selecting a review board member who lacks a track record in writing and research'' could constitute an ethical impropriety (Von Glinow & Novelli, 1982, p. 418) . This finding suggests that the ''norm of universalism in science'' (Merton, 1942 (Merton, /1973 , which requires that rewards and prestige depend exclusively on the quality of scientific achievements, operates within the management discipline. Furthermore, it coincides with our belief that a record of scientific achievements should be the primary qualification for editorial board membership.
It is our personal observation that being asked to serve in a gatekeeper position is seen as a distinct honor-testament to the significance of one's work-and that it is disconcerting to members of the profession when the universalism norm is seemingly violated in making editorial board appointments. Our impression is that this is especially true of young scholars, for whom editorial board memberships is symbolically viewed as synonymous with being judged enough of an expert to shape the content of our discipline's published record and consequently determine its scientific progress (Merton & Zuckerman, 1971 .
We likewise note that the management discipline takes pride in its ethical standards as reflected in the Academy of Management's (2005) ''Code of Ethical Conduct.'' According to the code, journal editors have ''a duty to judge manuscripts only on their scholarly merits'' (p. 1189). In turn, we would offer that journal editors have a commensurate duty to likewise select editorial board members on their ''scholarly merits.'' To do otherwise risks demoralizing scholars within our discipline who actively engage in research and publication and eroding the academic stratification system that is essential for motivating and rewarding scientific discovery (Lindsey, 1999) . We would also note that in addressing editorial board selection, a recent Academy of Management Journals Governance Task Force (2006) report concurs with our position, referring to editorial board members as ''the leading scholars and content experts in the field of management and organizations'' (p. 4).
An anonymous referee has suggested that, given the number of manuscripts submitted to management journals, it is impractical for authors to expect that their manuscripts will be reviewed by true peers. With the increase in manuscript flow over the past 25 years, this is a practical consideration. At the individual journal level, some editors have attempted to manage the increased number of manuscripts submitted for possible publication by instituting a two-stage reviewing system (Kilduff, 2007) . In the first stage, editors employing such a system prereview submissions to verify that they fall within their journal's scope. Manuscripts that do not pass this preliminary screen or, alternatively, are judged to be so conceptually or otherwise weak that acceptance seems highly improbable are returned to their authors. By truncating the review process at this stage, ''desk rejects'' reduce the volume of manuscripts requiring review, as well as the need for additional qualified referees. Thus, only those manuscripts that pass an initial screen are sent to referees for the second stage (i.e., in-depth) reviews. It is also our impression that more editors are striving to limit the burden on referees by effectively making an up or down decision on a manuscript's publishability after a first revision.
Other disciplines have addressed a shortage of qualified referees by commissioning fewer reviews per manuscript. By simply reducing the number of referees from three to two, all other things equal, one-third fewer referee reports would be required. In situations where an editor feels that the resulting reviews provide insufficient information on which to base a publication decision, an additional review is secured. At an extreme, manuscripts submitted to the Journal of For those who find this alternative objectionable, we would note that in situations where a manuscript is sent out for a single review and also independently reviewed by an editor, the minimum number of evaluation points is, in fact, two (Hollenbeck & Mannor, in press ). We would further note, however, that the low levels of interrater reliability normal for editorial decision making in the social sciences suggests that a manuscript's fate rests as much on the ''luck of the reviewer draw'' as its quality per se (Bedeian, 2004) . We would also observe that, even if chosen at random from all possible qualified scholars, the judgments of two or three referees are too few to yield a statistically stable basis for deciding a manuscript's fate. Per our comments above, this in itself is reason enough for not simply ''counting votes'' when deciding to accept or reject a manuscript for publication.
At its base, then, the decision to empanel a specific number of referees is a compromise between a need for an external assessment and a desire to preserve a scare resource, referees' time. As Fletcher and Fletcher (2003) counsel, ''editors who choose only one reviewer, and those who choose several, have simply made different trade-offs between the value of additional information and their wish to spare reviewers, and themselves, work'' (p. 67). Furthermore, as these authors noted, this choice is complicated by the fact that editors can never know in advance how much unique information will be gained by engaging multiple referees.
In this connection, it has always struck us as odd that so much emphasis is placed on the degree to which consensus exists across referees as an indication that the review process is valid. As we teach our students, high reliability is no guarantee of validity. Thus, as Daniel (1993) noted, ''A high level of agreement between reviewers in itself proves very little, since two reviewers might reach equally erroneous conclusions'' (p. 6). From a classical theory of measurement perspective, it is interesting to speculate on the extent to which the commissioning of nonpeer referees contributes to what Glick et al. (2007) considered to be the ''high random error component'' in the editorial decision process.
In the form of a third alternative for ensuring an adequate pool of qualified referees, journals in some disciplines require authors of articles that have been accepted for publication to agree to serve as ad hoc referees for submissions in their area of expertise.
As a fourth alternative, a number of journals levy submission fees to deter low-quality manuscripts from being submitted and, thereby, reduce the number of manuscripts to be reviewed. Such fees may also be used to compensate and, thus, encourage the cooperation of a larger number of potential referees (Azar, 2006 ).
On a more global level, an anonymous referee has observed that a fifth alternative for addressing the sheer volume of manuscripts submitted for review and the concomitant need for qualified referees is a reorganization of the formal structure common at most journals, which the referee characterizes as basically run like ''mom-and-pop shops.'' Recognizing the cost (in terms of promoting an effective and efficient science) of such a simple structure, the referee noted that ''most real-world organizations, when confronted with this kind of growth, develop hierarchical and functionally-oriented structures, where there are different levels of expertise represented at different levels, and different areas of functional expertise represented in different places.'' Thus, whereas in practice it appears that journals within our discipline have typically responded to an increased flow of manuscripts by adding more associate editors, they rarely enact structural changes that are necessary for more advantageously managing their increased workload. Although associate editors may act independently in terms of their decision-making authority, and there is some functional separation, their journals still maintain a flat organization with essentially two levels (editors/associate editors and referees).
In this anonymous referee's view, a more adaptive structure would require a breakdown by function and level. One alternative would be to have three senior associate editors working within functionally distinct areas (micro, meso, macro). Each editor would essentially operate a semiautonomous unit with further functional and hierarchical breakdowns at lower levels. As the referee further explains, the micro section would have separate units for different topic areas, and within those, there would be senior board members (Referee A), regular board members (Referee B), and ad hoc referees (Referee C). This kind of formal structure would both recognize and spread out the available talent in a way that would attract more senior participation and, at the same time, provide a meaningful ladder for young reviewers to climb.
Thus, rather than running our journals as small teams, they would be managed as the large-scale organizations they have, in reality, become. Such a structure also recognizes that no one person can be expected to have the specialized knowledge necessary to make every editorial decision on the full range of contemporary management topics and that no one person is likely to possess the familiarity required to select qualified referees across all subspecialties.
Implications for Management Research and Understanding. As our discipline's journals are our profession's dominant voice, our findings have implications for management research and understanding. Perhaps most obviously, the content of what we profess in the classroom and in other educational and consulting venues is tempered by the quality of our research and understanding. When the qualifications of a discipline's intellectual gatekeepers are suspect, the new knowledge that is registered in the discipline's name is likewise open to question (Pardeck & Meinert, 1999) . Are weak articles being published because editorial board members who participate in deciding what is published lack the necessary expertise to serve as legitimate peers? Are high-quality manuscripts being rejected for the same reason? This alone may explain why it so often seems that the judgment of a manuscript's suitability for publication rests as much on the ''luck of the reviewer draw'' as by its quality (Bedeian, 2004) .
The professional standing of management relative to its social science cousins is largely a function of the scientific rigor and integrity of its scholarship. Management as a discipline occupies an uneasy middle position in what Midgley (1999) dubbed ''the hierarchy of academic acceptability'' (p. 105). Responsible and transparent peer-review practices are essential for enhancing this acceptability within the wider academic community. Furthermore, to the extent that the peer-review process within the management discipline is suspect, its journals will become less impressive signals of the quality of an author's work. Moreover, ensuring the scientific authority of our discipline and its journals is central to attracting bright students, vying for competitive research grants, and convincing talented graduate students that devoting their lives to exploring management as a science is a worthy endeavor (Epstein, 1990) .
Beyond these internal matters, there are also broader implications concerning the role of the management discipline as a valued contributor to society. These considerations relate to public policy and the intellectual life of our nation and world. If our discipline truly aspires to ''matter more'' (Rynes & Shapiro, 2005) and influence public-policy makers to use our research (http://www.bawbglobalforum.org/), its scientific claims to efficacy must be beyond reproach. Such claims, however, will only be accepted as authoritative if they are recognized as having been appraised and authenticated by qualified referees who have shown through their own peer-reviewed publications a commitment to critical inquiry and research. Nothing less will be acceptable if we are to gain public confidence in our capacity as a discipline to address unresolved social challenges and recommend efficient and effective solutions.
Limitations
As with all studies, the current effort should be considered in light of its limitations. Each of these limitations, however, should be viewed as offering opportunities for future research to fill existing knowledge gaps. First, we realize that not all board members vet the same number of manuscripts or recommend the same percentage of manuscripts for publication or have the same percentage of editor concurrence with their recommendations. Consequently, their influence on a journal's content and a discipline's knowledge base will vary accordingly. In addressing this issue, Lindsey (1977) developed an index of editorial power to gauge the degree of influence individual board members wield in the manuscript-review process. As we did not have access to primary data (which would have been judged privileged editorial correspondence), we were unable to incorporate editorial board member power into our analysis. By the same token, without knowledge of the actual reviewing responsibilities of individual board members, we were likewise unable to discern if the various journals we studied listed highly cited individuals as members of their boards to simply lend a ''veneer of distinction'' to their mastheads (Lindsey, 1977, p. 579) . The citation counts of such ''figureheads,'' without their actual involvement in review activities, would prejudice our results. On a parallel note, our analysis specifically excluded ad hoc referees given our exclusive focus on criteria used in making editorial board appointments. In extending the current results, future researchers may wish to investigate the scholarly productivity and achievement levels of these guest reviewers.
Second, we realize that, whereas citation indexing is recognized as a valid measure of a scholar's eminence, like all observations it is nonetheless fallible. Citation counts favor those doing work in mainstream areas in accord with dominant paradigms (Lindsey, 1989) . Moreover, an author's work may be heavily cited for its weaknesses rather than its merits (Brooks, 2005) . ''Negative citations,'' however, are generally rare, even in the case of retracted articles (Gabehart, 2005) . We see no reason, however, for such citations to be nonrandomly distributed across disciplines and authors and thus to have biased our findings.
For similar reasons, it is unlikely that any propensity for author self-citations could have been so extreme as to have skewed our counts (Krampen, Becker, Wahner, & Montada, 2007) . We would note, however, that whereas some self-references may be gratuitous, in other instances they may be appropriate as a natural part of scientific communication (e.g., articles in a long-term research program; Glänzel & Thijs, 2004) . Because the editorial boards we studied were randomly selected, any such unmeasured effects should be equally distributed across groups and thus be nullified when making comparisons. Furthermore, self-citations lose weight in citation counts when fractionated by coauthors (Glänzel, Debackere, Thijs, & Schubert, 2006) .
A final concern is that we did not include Web documents, books, book reviews, book chapters, annual volumes, anthologies (which may include reprints), conference presentations, technical reports, open-access articles, and monographs in our analysis. This was a conscious decision on our part, however, as we again felt that judgments of research quality should be based on works that had been subject to traditional peer review. We recognize the value of such works and that some disciplines (e.g., sociology; Clemens, Powell, McIlwaine, & Okamoto, 1995) may favor these media over journal articles. We also note that the method we used is the same publication methodology used by the National Research Council to assess research activity (Holcombe, 2004) . In addition, we acknowledge that coauthorship patterns (Gauffriau & Larsen, 2005) , citation habits (Biehl, Kim, & Wade, 2006) , definitions of authorship (Biagioli, 2005) , and quality norms (Swanson, 2004) vary across disciplines and that these factors should be considered when making interdisciplinary comparisons. Thus, it is important to consider such differences when assessing research productivity and citation patterns across disciplines.
As a side point, a word on differences in the sizes of the academic disciplines we selected for study may be in order. In particular, when comparing the citation counts of scholars in different disciplines it may be thought necessary to consider the number of scholars working in those disciplines. One might reason, for instance, that the number of citations to work published in economics might be an artifact of the fact that there are more academic economists, more economics journals, and more work published in economics than another discipline, say, finance. As Cole and Cole (1971) explained, however, the notion that a work will receive more citations because its discipline is larger is a misconception (p. 26). Whereas more citations are produced in economics than finance, more work is also being done in economics and therefore more articles are potentially citable. Therefore, there is no basis on which to logically conclude that a relationship exists between the number of scholars working in a discipline and the number of citations a work may receive. Indeed, evidence provided by Cole and Cole (1973, p. 29) shows that there is no association between these variables.
Recognizing the critical role that editorial boards play in authenticating knowledge claims and in bestowing recognition on individual scholars, we examined the scientific achievements of the individuals selected to sit on the editorial boards of two premier journals in the management discipline. We hope that the implications suggested by our findings prompt serious reflection and provide a platform for open discussion and free dialogue about the qualifications necessary to judge new knowledge that enters our discipline. T. Clark and Wright (2007) correctly observed that peer review is an issue for all academic disciplines. In a reflective spirit, they went on to caution that, if we reject findings such as those presented here, ''we close down any discussion as to how the [editorialreview] process might be improved'' (p. 615). We join with these authors in believing that as members of the scientific community, we each have an obligation, distributively and collectively, to ''ensure that certain [editorial-review] practices are instituted, that they are clearly communicated to all relevant parties and that we revisit them on a regular basis to ensure that they are working as intended' ' (p. 615 ).
An anonymous referee of this article offered that in contrast to the ''normal science'' model for peer review that has guided science for more than three centuries, what is occurring in management is a Hollywood model where there are two kinds of people-those who produce films and film critics whose sole role is to evaluate films but who have never produced one. This has a pernicious effect because the critics do not really understand what is reasonable and unreasonable in the messy world of organizational research, where one rarely has random assignment to conditions and variables are not all multivariate normal.
Our data suggest that this referee's concerns may be legitimate. To this we add the belief that, as is true with aspiring authors, journals generally benefit from self-evaluation, and sometimes by evaluation from others. Such evaluation is necessary if our discipline is to produce credible knowledge.
In our own minds, we are left wondering why so little research has been published on management editorial boards, given their paramount role in determining the fate of ideas as well as individual careers. One explanation suggested by Pardeck (1992a) is that such investigations can be ''aversive to editors and perhaps result in deleterious consequences for the critic'' (p. 487). He goes on to quote C. Clark (1973) , who noted that ''to talk about the function of an editor is to make an issue of it, and this is what most editors would like to avoid. They, like the people they investigate, have self-conceptions which they would like to retain'' (pp. 4-5).
We fervently hope that our comments will not be viewed as a form of ad hominem affront. They are intended to convey our genuine concern for our discipline's well-being. Furthermore, as our analysis was based on the publication and citation records of editorial board members as an aggregated unit, not as individual scholars, our findings should not be taken to reflect on individual board members. Indeed, we have assiduously avoided any personal judgments of specific board members included in our analysis. In doing so, we have followed accepted research practice by describing group attributes as opposed to identifiable individual-level characteristics. This approach has the additional advantage of increasing the reliability of our data, as publication and citation counts to individuals are typically less reliable than counts for groups such as editorial boards (Baker, 1990) .
As Graf et al. (2007) noted: ''Academic publishing depends, to a great extent, on trust. Editors trust peer reviewers to provide fair assessments, authors trust editors to select appropriate peer reviewers, and readers put their trust in the peer-review process'' (p. 1). In closing, we in turn trust that those who exercise positions of privilege as journal editors will look within their own publishing franchises and critically examine the degree to which they not only judge manuscripts on their scholarly merits but also select editorial board members using the same standard. To do otherwise threatens the credibility enjoyed by our discipline and the spirit of scientific inquiry that brings us together as a community of scholars striving to advance knowledge within the management discipline.
